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Introduction
Human rights are among society’s most powerful ideals. The notion that all people have
rights, simply by virtue of their humanity, has sparked new nations, inspired countless
freedom movements, and transformed the relationship between people and their
governments in places big and small around the globe. The founders of our country
declared that we are all created equal and endowed with certain inalienable rights, and
that opinions of other nations are entitled to “decent respect.” In the aftermath of the
Holocaust and World War II, the United States helped craft the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights (UDHR) and the modern international human rights system. Throughout
our history, the concept of human rights has been central to our nation’s struggles to
achieve equality and justice for all.
Now, more than ever, domestic protection of human rights norms will be crucial as the
social justice community braces itself for uncertainty following threats to widely
accepted human rights norms. Courts continue to be a venue for human rights
advocacy and to secure and protect fundamental rights, equal justice, and human
dignity. State courts are of particular importance because they often consider economic,
social, and cultural rights, and in interpreting state law they have the independence to
recognize a broader range of rights than federal courts. In addition, state courts may be
called on to interpret and apply international treaties, including human rights treaties.
Recognizing this important aspect of the implementation of human rights law in the
United States, this report updates our 2014 report,1 which details the ways in which
state courts have considered and interpreted human rights. This report is intended for
public interest lawyers, state court litigators, and judges, and also for state and
municipal policymakers interested in integrating compliance with international human
rights law into their domestic policies.2
1

See MARTHA F. DAVIS ET AL., THE OPPORTUNITY AGENDA & PHRGE, HUMAN RIGHTS IN STATE COURTS 2014.

2

Many scholars and judges have concluded that state courts should look to international and comparative law as they explore
the meaning of positive rights under state constitutions, statutes, and common law. See, e.g., Margaret H. Marshall, Speech: “Wise
Parents Do Not Hesitate To Learn From Their Children”: Interpreting State Constitutions In An Age of Global Jurisprudence, 79
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1633 (2004); Shirley S. Abrahamson, Criminal Law and State Constitutions: The Emergence of State Constitutional
Law, 63 TEX. L. REV. 1141 (1985); Paul R. Dubinsky, International Law In The Legal System Of The United States , 58 A M. J. COMP. L.
455 (2010); Judith Resnik, Law’s Migration: American Exceptionalism, Silent Dialogues, and Federalism’s Multiple Ports of Entry ,
115 YALE L.J. 1564, 1628, n.300 (May 2006) (citing Martha F. Davis, Realizing Domestic Social Justice Through International Human
Rights: Part 1: The Spirit of Our Times: State Constitutions and International Human Rights , 30 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 359
(2006)); Robert Doughten, Filling Everyone’s Bowl: A Call to Affirm a Positive Right to Minimum Welfare Guarantees and Shelter in
State Constitutions to Satisfy Int’l Standards of Human Decency , 39 GONZ. L. REV. 421 (2003); Bert B. Lockwood et al., Litigating
State Constitutional Rights to Happiness and Safety: A Strategy for Ensuring the Provision of Basic Needs to the Poor , 2 WM. & MARY
BILL RTS. J. 1 (1993); Catherine Powell, Dialogic Federalism: Constitutional Possibilities for Incorporation of Human Rights Law in
the United States , 150 U. PA. L. REV. 245 (2001). See also Catherine Albisa & Sharda Sekaran, Realizing Domestic Social Justice
Through International Human Rights: Foreword , 30 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 351 (2006).

5

Litigants have continued to make arguments based on international human rights in
state courts since the last version of this report was published in 2014. As we noted in
the 2014 report, many of these arguments have been cursorily dismissed, with a few
courts and individual judges staking out their opposition to the application of
international human rights law. However, some state courts have considered and
affirmatively used international human rights law as persuasive authority for the
interpretation of state constitutions, statutes, and common law. Further, individual
judges regularly draw on human rights norms in concurring or dissenting opinions. This
updated publication is a supplement to the 2014 report and focuses on cases that have
been decided since that report was decided. 3

Highlights of this update include the following:
In Caballero v. De, a circuit court in Florida held that guerilla groups’ kidnapping
and murder of a former Colombian ambassador violated the law of nations and
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), the Convention against Torture (CAT), the
International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages, and the United Nations
Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, especially
Women and Children.4 The court granted partial summary judgment for the son
of Carlos Caballero, a former Columbian ambassador to the United Nations, who
sued guerilla groups and a drug cartel for taking his father hostage for six
months, torturing him, and killing him. 5 In order to sue under the Alien Tort
Statute, the plaintiff had to demonstrate that he was suing for a tort committed in
violation of “the law of nations.”6 The court held that the defendants’ activities
constituted violations of the “law of nations” because, in part, they violated the
aforementioned international treaties.
State courts continued to consider claims arising under Article 36 of the Vienna
Convention on Consular Relations (VCCR). In general, state courts held that the
VCCR provides a right to consular notification of detention but not to consular
intervention, and that a violation of the right to consular notification is not grounds
for suppressing incriminating statements.7
3

This update covers the time period from the release of our report in 2014, January 1, 2014 until August 1, 2016.

4

Caballero v. De, 2014 Fla. Cir. LEXIS 1910 *48 (Fla. 11th Cir. Ct. May 2, 2014), citing Estate of Ahuva Emergi et al. v. Palestinian
Authority, 611 F.3d 1350 (11th Cir. 2011) (“the existence of a treaty reflecting an overwhelming international consensus on certain
norms may be evidence of the specificity an international scope of concern required by the ATS”). Having determined that it had
subject matter jurisdiction over the counts related to hostage-taking, torture, extrajudicial killing, and crimes against humanity,
the court granted summary judgment on these counts because there were no outstanding matters of material fact. Id. at *57–58,
*60, *62, *64.
5

Id.

6

Id. at *47.

6

The Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction
(Hague Abduction Convention) continued to play a significant role in guiding
state courts in child custody hearings. State courts applied the Hague
Convention to resolve a variety of issues, including the identification and
significance of a child’s country of habitual residence, 8 the rights of custodial and
non-custodial parents to travel internationally with a child, 9 the right of one parent
to have a child returned to a country of habitual residence after the child was
wrongfully removed from that country,10 and the validity of various affirmative
defenses against removing a child from one parent for the purposes of returning
the child to a second parent.11
In Rayellen Resources, Inc. v. New Mexico Cultural Properties Review
Committee (NMCPRC), the NMCPRC designated approximately 400,000 acres
of land on Mount Taylor as “registered cultural property,” a designation that
several Native American tribes sought.12 The owners of the Cebolleta Land Grant
objected, arguing that the common lands within the Cebolleta Land Grant, which
were included in the 400,000 acres, were not “state lands” and so could not be
taken by the state and registered as “cultural property.” 13 The Supreme Court of
New Mexico agreed, noting that its interpretation of state statutes on the meaning
of “state land” must be consistent with New Mexico’s obligations under the Treaty
of Guadalupe Hidalgo, which recognizes the private property rights of New
Mexico landowners from Mexico.14
Litigants in state courts continue to invoke regional international norms, such as
those articulated in the Inter-American Convention on Letters Rogatory and
Additional Protocol.15 In Espinoza v. Evergreen Helicopters, Inc., for example, the
7

See, e.g., State v. Pedroza-Perez, 2014 Ariz. Super. LEXIS 582 (Super. Ct. Feb. 24, 2014); People v. Arteaga, 2014 Cal. App. Unpub.
LEXIS 7680 (Cal. App. 5th Dist. Oct. 27, 2014); Restrepo-Duque v. State, 130 A.3d 340 (Del. 2015); People v. Miroslava P. (In re
Miroslava P.), 2016 Ill. App. 2d 141022 (Ill. App. Ct. 2d Dist. 2016); Gonzalez v. Gage, 290 Neb. 671 (2015); State v. Cepates, No. A2080-11T2, 2014 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 628 (Super. Ct. App. Div. Mar. 24, 2014); State v. Risden, 2015 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS
2875 (Super. Ct. App. Div. Dec. 11, 2015); People v. Jemmott, 5 N.Y.S.3d 447 (App. Div. 2015); Engleton v. State, 2015 Tex. App.
LEXIS 2680; Ex parte Owenga, 2014 Tex. App. LEXIS 7265 (App. July 3, 2014); In re Garcia, 486 S.W.3d 565, 581-82 (Tex. Crim. App.
2016); Martinez v. State, 449 S.W.3d 193, 196 (Tex. App. 2014); Braynen v. Plumley, 2016 W. Va. LEXIS 222 (Ct. App. Apr. 8, 2016).
8

See, e.g., Cardenas v. Alcantar, 2014 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 3278 (Cal. App. 3d Dist. May 8, 2014); In re Marriage of Krol, 2015
Ill. App. 1st 140976 (App. Ct. 2015).
9

See, e.g., Moore v. Moore, 349 P.3d 1076 (Alaska 2015); Samb v. Richardson, 2015 Conn. Super. LEXIS 3130 (Super. Ct. Dec. 18,
2015); Sahibzada v. Sahibzada, 294 Ga. 783 (2014); In re Stern, 2015 Iowa App. LEXIS 154 (Ct. App. Feb. 11, 2015); Davis v. Ewalefo,
352 P.3d 1139 (2015).
10

See, e.g., Noergaard v. Noergaard, 244 Cal. App. 4th 76 (App. 4th Dist. 2015); Cardenas v. Alcantar, 2014 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS
3278 (App. 3d Dist. May 8, 2014); Bounouar v. Fa’Alofa, 2016 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 230 (App. 4th Dist. Jan. 14, 2016); Sanchez v.
Suasti, 140 So. 3d 658 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 3d Dist. 2014); In re Marriage of Krol, 2015 Ill. App. 1st 140976 (App. Ct. 1st Dist. 2015);
and R.B. v. K.G., 993 N.Y.S.2d 869, 872 (Fam. Ct.).
11

See, e.g., Noergaard v. Noergaard, 244 Cal. App. 4th 76 (App. 4th Dist. 2015).

12

Rayellen Res., Inc. v. N.M. Cultural Props. Review Comm., 319 P.3d 639, ¶ 1 (N.M. 2014).

13

Id.

14

Id.

15

See, e.g., Espinoza v. Evergreen Helicopters, Inc., 2016 Ore. 63 (2016). See also Cermesoni v. Maneiro, 144 So. 3d 627 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 3d Dist. 2014).
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Supreme Court of Oregon cited the treaty in analyzing whether it was appropriate
to move a set of wrongful death trials from Oregon, the preferred forum of the
plaintiffs, to Peru, the preferred forum of the defendant, an Oregon-based
helicopter company.16 The cases flowed from a helicopter accident in Peru in
which all of the passengers were killed. After determining that the doctrine of
forum non conveniens is available in Oregon, the Court held that the trial court
erred in accepting the defendant’s claim that Oregon was an inconvenient forum,
noting that the Inter-American Convention on Letters Rogatory and Additional
Protocol provides mechanisms for international evidence gathering. 17
In 2012, Connecticut’s new death penalty law provided that the death penalty
would be repealed for all crimes committed on or after April 25, 2012, but
retained for capital felonies committed prior to that date. 18 In Santiago v. State, a
defendant appealed his death sentence, arguing that it would be constitutionally
cruel and unusual to execute individuals who had committed capital crimes
before that date.19 The Connecticut Supreme Court agreed, noting that “following
its prospective abolition, this state’s death penalty no longer comports with
contemporary standards of decency” and “would violate the state’s constitutional
prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment.” 20 In reaching its conclusion,
the court considered the laws and practices of other jurisdictions, including
international jurisdictions.21 Two concurring justices, citing United Nations
documentation, noted that “there is a demonstrable global consensus that postrepeal executions are impermissible.”22 The case was remanded with instructions
to impose a sentence of life without parole. 23 In other states, however, arguments
for the general claim that the death penalty violates international norms and
treaties were unsuccessful.24
Some state courts rejected claims based on international treaties that the United
States has not ratified, generally holding that in the absence of implementing
legislation, non-self-executing treaties are not judicially enforceable. In AlvaradoFernandez v. Mazoff, for example, the court held that compliance with the InterAmerican Service Convention on Letters Rogatory and Additional Protocol was
16

Espinoza v. Evergreen Helicopters, Inc., 359 Or. 63 (2016).

17

Id. at 108, 108 n.25.

18

State v. Santiago, 318 Conn. 1, at *7-8 (2015).

19

Id. at 9.

20

Id. at 9.

21

Id. at 44, 51, 77–78.

22

Id. at 195 (emphasis in original).

23

Id. at 140.

24

See, e.g., People v. Mendoza, 365 P.3d 297 (Cal. 2016), cert denied, 2016 U.S. LEXIS 5460; People v. Avila, 327 P.3d 821 (Cal.
2014), cert. denied, 135 S.Ct. 1712 (2015); People v. Chism, 324 P.3d 183 (Cal. 2014), cert denied, 135 S.Ct. 403 (2014); People v.
Sattiewhite, 328 P.3d 1 (Cal. 2014); State v. Kirkland, 15 N.E.3d 818 (Ohio 2014); State v. Sandy, 2015 Ohio Misc. LEXIS 1989.
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not required because the treaty was not self-executing. 25
In State v. Houston, a dissenting justice of the Supreme Court of Utah disagreed
with the majority and argued that sentencing a juvenile to life without parole
constitutes cruel and unusual punishment under the Utah Constitution, citing the
United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC). 26
A member of the Wisconsin State Assembly asked the Wisconsin Attorney
General to determine whether a statutory limit on land acquisition by nonnational individuals or corporations applied to nations that had signed the
General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS), 27 an international treaty
designed to promote trade in services.28 The Attorney General concluded that the
statutory limit did not apply to such nations, noting that GATS signatory nations,
such as the United States, are bound to treat nationals and non-nationals in the
same way with respect to most types of service-related land acquisition. 29 He
also noted that the Wisconsin statute exempts non-nationals “whose rights to
hold larger quantities of land are secured by treaty.” 30

Examples of the breadth and diversity of state court decisions that have drawn upon
international human rights law over the years that we have detailed in the 2014 report
are listed below:
California courts cited the UDHR to support their interpretation of the right to
practice one’s trade, the right to privacy, the meaning of “physical handicap,” the
right to freedom of movement, and the scope of welfare provisions; 31

25

Alvarado-Fernandez v. Mazoff, 151 So. 3d 8, 13, 16 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2014) (“The effect that international legal agreements
entered into by the United States have upon domestic law are dependent upon the nature of the agreement; namely, whether the
agreement is self-executing or non-self-executing. International treaties are considered "self-executing" if they have the force of
law without the need for subsequent legislative action. Treaties that are not considered self-executing are understood to require
implementing legislation to provide legal authority to carry out the functions and obligations contemplated by the agreement, or
to make them enforceable in court by private parties.”). See also State v. Horton, 2016 Ariz. App. Unpub. LEXIS 530, *6 ¶ 28 (Ct.
App. 2016) (rejecting appellant’s claims based on the ICCPR on the grounds that “the ICCPR is not binding on courts of the United
States” and because it “does not create judicially-enforceable individual rights, is not self-executing, and has not been given effect
by congressional legislation.”).
26

State v. Houston, 2015 UT 40, ¶ 275 (2015) (dissenting) (“In the case of juvenile LWOP, the international consensus against the
penalty is all but unanimous. The United States is the only country in the world that currently sentences juveniles to a life
imprisonment with no chance of release.”).
27

Wis. Stat. § 710.02.

28

2014 Wis. AG LEXIS 11.

29

Id. ¶ 11.

30

Id. ¶ 17.

31

Bixby v. Pierno, 481 P.2d 242, 251 n.9, 253 n.12 (Cal. 1971); Santa Barbara v. Adamson, 610 P.2d 436, 440 n.2 (Cal. 1980); Am.
Nat’l Life Ins. Co. v. Fair Employment & Housing Comm., 610 P.2d 436, 442 n.4 (Cal. 1982); In re White, 158 Cal. Rptr. 562, 567 n.5
(Ct. App. 1979).

9

New York courts invoked the UDHR in cases involving the rights to work and to
strike, a transnational discovery dispute, and the act of state doctrine; 32
The Oregon Supreme Court looked to the UDHR, ICCPR, and European
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms to
interpret the meaning of the state constitution’s provision on the treatment of
prisoners;33
The West Virginia Supreme Court invoked the UDHR to review the financing
scheme for public schools and to define the right to education; 34
The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court gave retroactive effect to a ruling
that the sentence of a juvenile to life without the possibility of parole is
unconstitutional, and emphasized that the U.S. “join a world community that has
broadly condemned such punishment for juveniles,” citing to the United Nations
Convention of the Rights of Child and to the author of the Massachusetts
Constitution, John Adams, who was a proponent of learning from other nations. 35
These decisions used human rights law as persuasive authority in interpreting state
constitutions, statutes, and common law.

32

Wilson v. Hacker, 101 N.Y.S.2d 461, 472–73 (Sup.Ct. 1950); Jamur Prod. Corp. v. Quill, 273 N.Y.S.2d 348, 356 (Sup.Ct. 1966); In
re Estate of Vilensky, 424 N.Y.S.2d 821 (Sur. Ct. 1979).
33

Sterling v. Cupp, 625 P.2d 123, 131 (Or. 1981).

34

Pauley v. Kelly, 255 S.E.2d 859, 864 (W. Va. 1979).

35

Diatchenko v. District Att’y, 466 Mass. 655, n. 16 (2013).

10

Methodology
For this report, we assessed the use of international human rights in state courts by
examining many of the same indicators used in the 2014 report. We reviewed, for each
particular state, case law and Attorney General Opinions and searched for terms that
indicate the consideration of international human rights law.
In Appendix A, there is the list of our search terms. Based on our findings, we compiled
a list and analysis of all of the cases and Attorney General Opinions that were found.
This update is based on that body of research and covers the time period from the
release of our last update, January 1, 2014, until August 1, 2016.
This update covers the time period from the release of our last update, January 1, 2014,
until August 1, 2016.
This report uses the following abbreviations:
American Convention: American Convention on Human Rights
American Declaration: American Declaration on the Rights and Duties of Man
CAT: Convention Against Torture
CERD: International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination
CRC: International Convention on the Rights of the Child
Hague Convention: Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child
Abduction
ICCPR: International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
ICESCR: International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights
UDHR: Universal Declaration of Human Rights
UNHRC: United Nations Human Rights Committee
VCCR: Vienna Convention on Consular Relations
American Letters Protocol: Inter-American Convention on Letters Rogatory and
Additional Protocol

11

International Human
Rights in State Courts
The following discussion examines the role international human rights law has played in
state court decisions, breaking down cases by state and grouping them as civil or
criminal matters. The discussion does not identify every single decision in which a state
court has discussed international human rights law. Rather, it describes major and
representative cases concerning challenges to the death penalty, claims under the
VCCR on Consular Relations, and cases arising under the Hague Convention on the
Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction. State courts most often turn to
international human rights law when it is offered as an interpretive guide for the
development of rights enumerated in state constitutions or statutes.

12

ALASKA
CIVIL

MOORE V. MOORE
349 P.3d 1076 (Alaska 2015)

FACTUAL SUMMARY:
When the parents of a ten-year-old girl divorced in 2014, the superior court granted sole
legal and primary physical custody of the child to the mother, and unrestricted domestic
and international visitation to the father. After the father proposed taking the child to
Micronesia, the mother moved to limit the father’s international visitation to countries
that have ratified the Hague Convention. The superior court judge denied the mother’s
motion, noting that “I don’t care if it’s a Hague Convention country or not. [Travel] is a
good thing, in my mind.”36 The mother filed a motion for reconsideration, arguing that the
superior court had failed to consider her arguments about the significance of the Hague
Convention. The superior court denied the motion. 37 The mother appealed, arguing that
the superior court abused its discretion in allowing travel to a country that is not a
Hague Convention signatory.

CASE SUMMARY:
The Supreme Court of Alaska held that the superior court did not abuse its discretion in
awarding the father unrestricted international visitation. In an extended discussion of the
Hague Convention, the court noted that “a bright-line rule restricting international
visitation to Hague Convention signatory nations” would be a mistake; 38 that in
determining international visitation rights, the Hague Convention is only one of a
number of competing and important factors; that “extradition treaties can provide

36

Moore v. Moore, 349 P.3d 1076, 1079 (Alaska 2015).

37

Id. at 1077.

38

Id. at 1081.

13

assurances against non-return;”39 and that “travel is generally beneficial and in a child’s
best interest.”40

39

Id. at 1082.

40

Id. at 1083.

14

ARIZONA
CRIMINAL

STATE V. HORTON
2016 Ariz. App. Unpub. LEXIS 530 (Ct. App. 2016)

FACTUAL SUMMARY:
The defendant was found guilty of two counts of aggravated assault and one count of
disorderly conduct.41 The defendant appealed, arguing that his convictions violated the
ICCPR.

CASE SUMMARY:
The Arizona Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the ICCPR is not self-executing,
has not been given effect by any congressional legislation, and is not binding on U.S.
courts. 42

STATE V. PEDROZA-PEREZ
2014 Ariz. Super. LEXIS 582 (Super. Ct. Feb. 24, 2014)

FACTUAL SUMMARY:
On June 25, 2013, Pima County Sheriff’s deputies and U.S. Customs & Border Patrol
agents found several backpacks containing marijuana that belonged to the defendant.
The defendant was detained and, after being informed of his Miranda rights, he made
several admissions. Law enforcement officers then informed the defendant of his
41

State v. Horton, No. 1 CA-CR 15-0179, 2016 Ariz. App. Unpub. LEXIS 530, at *5 (Ct. App. May 3, 2016).

42

Id. at *14–15.

15

consular notification rights under the VCCR. The defendant was charged with the
importation of marijuana, the transportation of marijuana for sale, and the possession of
drug paraphernalia. He moved to suppress his admissions, arguing that he was
questioned in violation of his constitutional rights and his rights under the VCCR. 43

CASE SUMMARY:
The superior court declined to suppress the defendant’s admissions. In dicta, the court
noted that relief under the VCCR is available only if prejudice is shown; that none was
alleged in this case; and that even if the court were to find prejudice, the proper remedy
would be “accommodations to secure consular assistance, not suppression.” 44

43

State v. Pedroza-Perez, 2014 Ariz. Super. LEXIS 582 at *2 (Super. Ct. Feb. 24, 2014).

44

Id. at *9.

16

CALIFORNIA
CIVIL

NOERGAARD V. NOERGAARD
244 Cal. App. 4th 76 (App. 4th Dist. 2015)

FACTUAL SUMMARY:
While a mother and father were living with two daughters in Germany, the mother
relocated to California with the eldest daughter. The father made an ex parte demand
for custody in a Hague petition that he filed in superior court. The mother offered an
affirmative defense of grave risk of harm based on her claim that the father had issued
death threats against her and the eldest daughter and that he had engaged in spousal
and child abuse. Despite the mother’s request for an evidentiary hearing on these
allegations, the court conducted a summary trial and granted the father’s custody
demand. The mother appealed.45

CASE SUMMARY:
The Court of Appeal reversed the judgment, holding that the trial court, in excluding the
mother’s evidence of spousal and child abuse, and in failing to address the mother’s
death threat allegations, had violated the mother’s due process rights to a fair and
adequate hearing. The court noted that the mother’s allegations, if substantiated, might
have prevented the return of the daughter to her father under the Hague Convention.
The case was remanded for a full evidentiary hearing.

45

Noergaard v. Noergaard, 244 Cal. App. 4th 76, 81–82 (2015).

17

CARDENAS V. ALCANTAR
2014 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 3278 (App. 3d Dist. May 8, 2014)

FACTUAL SUMMARY:
A mother filed a Hague Convention petition for the return of her three-year-old son from
California to Mexico. The trial court denied the petition, holding that the mother had
failed to show that the father had removed the son from his country of habitual
residence. The court also expressly declined to make a determination about the son’s
country of habitual residence. On appeal, the mother contended that the trial court
abused its discretion in refusing to determine whether Mexico or California was the
son’s habitual residence.46

CASE SUMMARY:
The Court of Appeal affirmed, noting that it was the mother’s burden, under the Hague
Convention, to establish that Mexico was the child’s country of habitual residence.

BOUNONUAR V. FA’ALOFA
2016 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 230

FACTUAL SUMMARY:
A mother took her son from his habitual residence in France to the United States. The
trial court held a hearing and ordered the son returned to France, stating that the case
was a “classic example of what the Hague Convention is designed to prevent.” 47 In her
appeal, the mother invoked the “grave risk of harm” affirmative defense, arguing that
under the Hague Convention a child should not be returned to a country of habitual
residence if doing so would put the child at risk of serious harm.

CASE SUMMARY:
The Court of Appeal affirmed the lower court’s ruling, holding that the mother did not
meet her burden of showing that her son would face a serious risk of harm by returning
to his father. The court noted that the “grave risk of harm” defense under the Hague
46

Cardenas v. Alcantar, No. C071984, 2014 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 3278, at *1–2 (Ct. App. May 8, 2014).

47

Bounouar v. Fa'Alofa, No. D066948, 2016 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 230, at *1 (Ct. App. Jan. 14, 2016).
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Convention is “narrowly drawn” and “contemplates an intolerable situation where there
is clear and convincing evidence the child would suffer ‘serious abuse’ as a result of
being returned.”48

CRIMINAL

PEOPLE V. MENDOZA
62 Cal. 4th 856 (2016)

FACTUAL SUMMARY:
The defendant was convicted of three counts of first degree murder and was sentenced
to death. Appeal was automatic.49

CASE SUMMARY:
The defendant challenged the conviction and the sentence on multiple grounds, four of
which implicated international human rights issues. First, the defendant argued that
international human rights norms support his claim that there was insufficient evidence
of his mental competence to stand trial. The court rejected this argument, noting that the
defendant himself acknowledged that U.S. and international standards for evaluating
competence are similar, and that to the extent that international standards are higher,
the defendant had failed to show why the higher standard was required by federal or
state law.50 Second, the defendant argued that the imposition of the death penalty on
him violated international law because he “was seriously mentally ill at the time of the
offenses and at trial.”51 The court dismissed this argument as undeveloped and flawed
by incomplete citations to UN documents that were not on point. 52 Third, the defendant
argued that the imposition of the death penalty violates international law. The court
dismissed this argument as one that had been litigated and rejected multiple times in
California courts.53 Finally, the defendant argued that his rights under the VCCR were
violated when the police failed to inform him of his right to notify the Mexican consulate,
48

Id. at *28.

49

People v. Mendoza, 62 Cal. 4th 856, 861, 198 Cal. Rptr. 3d 445, 453, 365 P.3d 297, 304 (2016).

50

Id. at 895.

51

Id. at 908.

52

Id. at 910.

53

Id. at 915–16.
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and again when the police failed to notify the consulate on his behalf. The defendant
noted that he raised the issue to preserve it for review by way of a writ of habeas
corpus. The court agreed that a claim involving an alleged prejudicial effect of a VCCR
violation should indeed be raised in a petition for writ of habeas corpus. 54

PEOPLE V. CHISM
58 Cal. 4th 1266 (2014)

FACTUAL SUMMARY:
The defendant was convicted of first degree murder, attempted robbery, and second
degree robbery. A jury sentenced the defendant to death. 55

CASE SUMMARY:
On appeal, the defendant argued that “in the absence of a finding that he intended to kill
the victim or exhibited reckless indifference to life as a major participant in the
robbery,”56 the imposition of the death penalty violates international law. The Supreme
Court of California dismissed this claim, stating that “international law does not prohibit
a sentence of death rendered in accordance with state and federal constitutional and
statutory requirements”57 and that the “use of the death penalty does not violate
international law.”58

PEOPLE V. SATTIEWHITE
59 Cal. 4th 446 (2014)

FACTUAL SUMMARY:
The defendant was convicted of rape, kidnapping, and murder, and sentenced to
death.59
54

Id. at 917.

55

People v. Chism, 58 Cal. 4th 1266, 1278 (2014).

56

Id. at 1332.

57

Id. at 1333 (citing People v. Watkins (2012) 55 Cal. 4th 999, 1034, 150 Cal. Rptr. 3d 299, 290 P.3d 364).

58

Id. at 1334 (citing People v. Livingston (2012) 53 Cal. 4th 1145, 1180, 140 Cal. Rptr. 3d 139, 274 P.3d 1132).

59

People v. Sattiewhite, 59 Cal. 4th 446, 453 (2014).
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CASE SUMMARY:
On appeal, the defendant argued that the imposition of the death penalty violated
multiple rights, namely the right to life, the right to be tried before an impartial tribunal,
the right to have access to the courts, the right to protection against prosecutorial
misconduct, and the right to a fair hearing. He argued that these rights are “protected by
international law and treaties to which the United States is a signatory, including the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights.”60 The Supreme Court of California denied the claim that the death
penalty itself violates international norms and noted that it has rejected this argument
“repeatedly and consistently in other cases.” 61

PEOPLE V. ARTEAGA
2014 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 7680 (App. 5th Dist. Oct. 27, 2014)

FACTUAL SUMMARY:
The defendant was convicted of engaging in sexual intercourse or sodomy with a child
ten years or younger, and engaging in oral copulation or sexual penetration of a child
ten years old or younger.62

CASE SUMMARY:
On appeal, the defendant argued that because he was never informed of his right to
consular notification under the VCCR, the self-incriminating statements he made to
police during a custodial interrogation should have been suppressed and, as a result,
his conviction should have been reversed. The court disagreed, noting that the VCCR
provides a right to consular notification, not consular intervention; that suppression is
not the appropriate remedy for a violation of the VCCR; that failing to inform a defendant
of consular notification rights is unlikely, in general, to produce unreliable confessions;
and that in this case, the defendant’s statements to police were voluntary and
uncoerced.63

60

Id. at *489.

61

Id. at *489 (internal citations omitted).

62

People v. Arteaga, 2014 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 7680, at *1 (App. 5th Dist. Oct. 27, 2014).

63

Id. at *36–38.
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CONNECTICUT
CIVIL

SAMB V. RICHARDSON
2015 Conn. Super. LEXIS 3130 (Super. Ct. Dec. 18, 2015)

FACTUAL SUMMARY:
The mother and father shared joint legal custody. The mother requested the inclusion of
international travel in the custody agreement, and the father objected, arguing that the
mother was likely to take the child to Senegal, which is not a signatory to the Hague
Convention.64

CASE SUMMARY:
A Connecticut superior court held that it was not in the best interests of the child to
permit the mother to travel internationally with the child. The court noted that it seemed
likely that the mother would take the child to Senegal; that there was credible evidence
that the mother would refuse to return the child to the United States; and that were the
child to be held abroad by the mother, the fact that Senegal had not signed the Hague
Convention would burden the father’s efforts to bring the child back to the United
States.65

CRIMINAL

STATE V. SANTIAGO
122 A.3d 1 (Conn. 2015)
64

Samb v. Richardson, 2015 Conn. Super. LEXIS 3130, *1–3 (Super. Ct. Dec. 18, 2015).

65

Id. at *10–11.
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FACTUAL SUMMARY:
The defendant was convicted of capital felony murder for pecuniary gain and sentenced
to death.66 The defendant appealed.

CASE SUMMARY:
On appeal, the defendant argued that given Connecticut’s new law prohibiting the death
penalty for capital crimes committed after April 25, 2012, it would be constitutionally
cruel and unusual to execute individuals who had committed capital crimes before that
date as well.67 After surveying state, regional, national, and international law and
practices, the Supreme Court of Connecticut agreed, noting that the state’s death
penalty “no longer comports with contemporary standards of decency.” 68

66

State v. Santiago, 122 A.3d 1, 9 (Conn. 2015).

67

Id. at 9.

68

Id. at 9.
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DELAWARE
CRIMINAL

RESTREPO-DUQUE V. STATE
130 A.3d 340 (Del. 2015)

FACTUAL SUMMARY:
The defendant was charged with several crimes, including first-degree murder. In his
motion to suppress, the defendant argued that the police officer’s failure to advise him
of his consular notification rights under the VCCR were grounds for the suppression of
his statement to the police.69 The superior court acknowledged that the VCCR
establishes a right to consular notification, but held that even though the defendant did
not receive a timely notification of this right, suppression was an inappropriate remedy. 70
The court denied the motion and the defendant was ultimately convicted. 71 The court
later granted the defendant a new trial, at which he was convicted of second degree
murder.72

CASE SUMMARY:
On appeal, the defendant argued that the superior court had abused its discretion in
failing to suppress his statements to police because the police had not informed him of
his right to consular notification under the VCCR. 73 The Supreme Court of Delaware
rejected this argument, noting that while the VCCR provides a right to consular
notification, it does not provide a right to consular intervention, and that the suppression
69

Restrepo-Duque v. State, 130 A.3d 340, 340 (Del. 2015) (cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 2413).

70

Id. (citing Sanchez–Llamas v. Oregon , 548 U.S. 331 (2006)). See MARTHA F. DAVIS ET AL., THE OPPORTUNITY AGENDA & PHRAGE, HUMAN
RIGHTS IN STATE COURTS 2014 - 42 for a discussion of the court’s ruling on the defendant’s motion to suppress.
71

State v. Restrepo-Duque, 2013 Del. Super. LEXIS 36, 2014 WL 1925759 (Super. Ct. Feb. 19, 2013) (2014).

72

Restrepo-Duque v. State, 130 A.3d 340 (Del. 2015).

73

Id.
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of the defendant’s statement would not be a proportional response to a violation of the
VCCR.74

74

Id.
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FLORIDA
CIVIL

CABALLERO V. DE
2014 Fla. Cir. LEXIS 1910 (11th Cir. Ct. May 2, 2014)

FACTUAL SUMMARY:
The plaintiff alleged that three Columbian drug trafficking and terrorist organizations
kidnapped, tortured, and killed his father while engaged in illegal drug trafficking in
Columbia and Florida.75 The plaintiff sued pursuant to the Alien Tort Statute.

CASE SUMMARY:
The court granted summary judgment in favor of the plaintiff, finding that the defendants
violated domestic and international law. In reaching this decision, the court cited the
International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages, the United Nations Protocol to
Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, the UDHR, CAT, and the
ICCPR.76

ALVARADO-FERNANDEZ V. MAZOFF
151 So. 3d 8 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 4th Dist. 2014)

FACTUAL SUMMARY:

75

Caballero v. De, 2014 Fla. Cir. LEXIS 1910, at *2 (11th Cir. Ct. May 2, 2014).

76

Id. at *3.
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The plaintiff filed a lawsuit against the defendant, a Colombian citizen, for injuries that
were sustained when the defendant’s vehicle hit the plaintiff’s vehicle. 77 The defendant
moved to dismiss, alleging that service of process was insufficient under both the
Hague Service Convention and the Inter-American Service Convention on Letters
Rogatory and Additional Protocol.78 The court denied the defendant’s motion.

CASE SUMMARY:
The Court of Appeal of Florida affirmed the lower court’s ruling on the grounds that
Columbia was not a signatory to the Hague Service Convention at the time of the
accident, and that compliance with the Inter-American Letters Protocol was not required
because the treaty is not self-executing.79

SANCHEZ V. SUASTI
140 So. 3d 658 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 3d Dist. 2014)

FACTUAL SUMMARY:
At the time of a divorce, the parents and children lived in Brazil. The mother had
custody of the children subject to a visitation schedule for the father. In 2012, the
mother took the children to Miami, where she and the children remained. A Brazilian
court granted the father’s petition for the return of the children, noting that under
Brazilian law “the mother could not change the children’s country of residence without
the father’s consent or a court order.” 80 While the Brazilian court proceedings were
under way, the father petitioned a trial court in Miami for the return of his children. The
trial court denied the father’s petition on the grounds that under the Hague Convention,
the father had a “right of access” to the children but lacked the requisite “right of
custody.” 81 The father appealed.

CASE SUMMARY:

77

Alvarado-Fernandez v. Mazoff, 151 So. 3d 8, 11 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2014).

78

Id. at 12.

79

Id. at 13, 16.

80

Sanchez v. Suasti, 140 So. 3d 658, 660 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2014).

81

Id. at 661.
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The Court of Appeal of Florida reversed and remanded, noting that because the
Brazilian court had recognized the father’s “right to prohibit the mother from changing
the children’s country of residence without his consent,” the father had a “right to
custody” under U.S. law “sufficient to trigger a return under the Hague Convention.” 82

CERMESONI V. MANEIRO
144 So. 3d 627 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2014)

FACTUAL SUMMARY:
During divorce proceedings, an Argentinian court ordered that the husband’s assets in a
Miami bank accounts be frozen, and subsequently issued letters rogatory seeking the
assistance of Miami-based courts. A circuit court in Florida gave effect to the letters
rogatory by granting the wife’s emergency motion for a temporary injunction freezing the
relevant bank accounts. The wife was required to post a modest injunction bond. The
husband moved to increase the injunction bond. 83 The court denied the husband’s
motion, and he appealed.

CASE SUMMARY:
The Court of Appeal of Florida affirmed the lower court’s denial of the motion, noting
that while it often approves the enforcement of temporary injunctions issued by foreign
courts as a matter of international comity, its role was ancillary and strictly limited. The
court declined “to insinuate itself into the case” and noted that the husband could more
appropriately seek relief in the Argentinian court with subject matter jurisdiction over the
freeze order.84

82

Id. at 661–662.

83

Cermesoni v. Maneiro, 144 So. 3d 627, 628 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 3d Dist. 2014).

84

Id. at 630–31.
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GEORGIA
CIVIL

SAHIBZADA V. SAHIBZADA
294 Ga. 783 (2014)

FACTUAL SUMMARY:
In a final decree of divorce, a Georgia superior court prohibited a father from travelling
internationally with his children without the mother’s consent, until the children were
sixteen. The father is a native of Pakistan and a citizen of both Pakistan and the United
States.85 The father appealed.

CASE SUMMARY:
The Supreme Court of Georgia affirmed, noting that a “trial court has the discretion to
prohibit removal of minor children from the United States” 86 and that because Pakistan
is not a signatory to the Hague Convention the mother “would likely have difficulty
pursuing recourse” were the father to take the children to Pakistan and remain there. 87

85

Id. at 783.

86

Id. at 784.

87

Id. at 786, n.3.
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ILLINOIS
CIVIL

IN RE MARRIAGE OF KROL
29 N.E.3d 433 (Ill. App. Ct. 1st Dist. 2015)

FACTUAL SUMMARY:
While the mother and father lived in Poland with their child, the mother took the child to
the United States without the father’s consent and filed a petition for divorce and
custody in an Illinois court.88 The father filed a Hague petition in an Illinois court,
requesting that the court determine the child’s country of habitual residence. 89 The
Illinois court found that the child’s country of habitual residence was Poland and ordered
that the child be returned there.90 The wife filed a motion to reconsider and vacate the
order. Shortly thereafter, she filed a motion for the voluntary dismissal of her petition for
dissolution of the marriage.91 The court denied her motion to reconsider and vacate the
order.92 A few years later, the court held that the mother had the right to dismiss her
petition for the dissolution of the marriage, and that the father’s Hague petition survived
the dissolution of the underlying complaint (i.e., the mother’s dissolution petition). 93 The
court again ordered the wife to return the child to Poland, which she did. The wife
appealed the court’s ruling on the husband’s Hague petition. 94

CASE SUMMARY:
88

In re Marriage of Krol, 29 N.E.3d 433 ¶¶1–4 (Ill. App. Ct. 1st Dist. 2015).

89

Id.

90

Id. ¶ 8.

91

Id. ¶¶ 8, 9.

92

Id. ¶ 10.

93

Id. ¶ 12.

94

Id. ¶1–4.
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The wife argued that the trial court erred in allowing the husband’s Hague petition to
survive after the dismissal of her divorce petition, and that it was no longer in the best
interests of the child to return to Poland because the child’s circumstances had
changed, in that the child had acclimated to the United States. The court held that the
husband’s Hague petition survived the dismissal of the wife’s divorce petition, noting
that if the court had ruled otherwise, the wife would have effectively used the voluntary
dismissal of her divorce petition as a mechanism for preventing the Illinois court from
reaching the merits of the husband’s Hague Convention petition. 95 The court also
rejected the wife’s “changed circumstances” defense, noting that it was not one of the
affirmative defenses specified in the Hague Convention and the court was “not
persuaded to undertake … as a ‘matter of first impression’ whether defenses outside
the Convention are applicable.”96

CRIMINAL

PEOPLE V. MIROSLAVA
52 N.E.3d 470 (Ill. App. Ct. 2d Dist. 2016)

FACTUAL SUMMARY:
The court initially granted the government's petitions for the involuntary administration of
psychotropic medications to and the involuntary admission of the respondent, a
Bulgarian citizen. The respondent moved to strike the petitions, citing both the VCCR’s
provision on consular notification and the Illinois state code. The court denied the
motions to strike, noting that a violation of the terms of the VCCR did not provide a
basis for striking the petitions and that the state code was inapplicable. The respondent
moved to reconsider, arguing that the failure to adequately notify the consulate should
have precluded a consideration of the merits of the petitions. The respondent cited a
different provision of the Illinois state code, which requires that following an involuntary
admission, if the person involuntarily admitted requests that that State notify other
individuals of the admission, the State must notify at least two of these individuals. The
court granted the motion to reconsider on the grounds that violation of the state code
concerning notification warranted a reversal of the involuntary admission order and the
medication order. The State appealed the decision.

95

Id. ¶¶ 20–21, 24.

96

Id. ¶ 29.
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CASE SUMMARY:
The appellate court affirmed, holding that under Illinois state code, a foreign national
may designate a local consul as one of two “persons” who must be notified of the
involuntary admission. The appellate court noted that “[u]nlike a violation of the Vienna
Convention, the State’s violation of the Code provides a basis for a respondent’s
individual relief.” The appellate court noted that while a violation of the VCCR’s
notification requirements did not provide a basis for individual relief, 97 the state had
“eroded its goodwill with the court [through] “its decision to ignore clear language in the
Vienna Convention.”98

97

Id. ¶56.

98

Id. ¶60.
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IOWA
CIVIL

IN RE STERN
In re Stern, 2015 Iowa App. LEXIS 154, (Ct. App. Feb. 11, 2015)

FACTUAL SUMMARY:
A father appealed the visitation provisions of his divorce decree, challenging a
restriction that prohibited visitation in Israel until the child is sixteen years old. 99 The
mother argued that the father had previously stated that he would not return the child to
the United States, and that he had disobeyed visitation orders. 100

CASE SUMMARY:
The Iowa Court of Appeals held that the district court erred in prohibiting the father from
traveling with the child to Israel, noting that Israel is a signatory to the Hague
Convention, and that courts are in the practice of allowing international travel to
countries that are signatories. The court also noted that there was insufficient evidence
for the claim that the father intended to remain with the child in Israel. 101 The court
stated that the child “has a right to build a meaningful relationship with his father and
fully experience his dual heritage.”102

99

In re Stern, 2015 Iowa App. LEXIS 154 at *1–3 (Ct. App. Feb. 11, 2015).

100

Id. at *5–6.

101

Id. at *8–9.

102

Id. at *5.
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MAINE
CIVIL

SEEKINS V. HAMM
2015 Me. 157 (2015)

FACTUAL SUMMARY:
The parents met in Guatemala, where their child was born. The father filed a complaint
for parental rights and responsibilities in Maine, a state to which the mother and child
had never traveled.103 The district court granted the mother’s motion to dismiss on the
grounds that under the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act, “the
initial child custody determination must be made in the ‘home state’ … absent a
showing that the home state has declined jurisdiction,” and that the child’s “home state”
was Guatemala.104 The father appealed, citing the Hague Convention. 105

CASE SUMMARY:
The Supreme Judicial Court of Maine affirmed, holding that the district court lacked
jurisdiction because under the Hague Convention, U.S. state courts must treat foreign
countries as though they were U.S. states, unless their custody laws violate
“fundamental principles of human rights.” 106 The court noted that there was no evidence
in the record that Guatemala custody laws violate fundamental principles of human
rights or that Guatemala had declined jurisdiction. 107

103

Seekins v. Hamm, 2015 Me. 157 ¶1 ( 2015).

104

Id. ¶ 4.

105

Id. ¶ 3.

106

Id. ¶ 8.

107

Id. ¶10.
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NEBRASKA
CRIMINAL

GONZALEZ V. GAGE
290 Neb. 671 (2015)

FACTUAL SUMMARY:
The defendant, who had been convicted of first degree sexual assault on a child, filed a
pro se petition for a writ of habeas corpus, alleging that his consular notification rights
under the VCCR were violated. The district court held that the defendant’s action
seeking a writ of habeas corpus was frivolous and denied his related motion to proceed.
The defendant appealed.108

CASE SUMMARY:
On appeal, the defendant argued that the violation of his consular notification rights
under the VCCR deprived the trial court of its jurisdiction, and that he was therefore
entitled to a writ of habeas corpus. The Supreme Court of Nebraska, without deciding
that the VCCR creates individually enforceable rights, held that a violation of any
potential rights was “a mere error or irregularity in the proceedings”—one that did not
deprive the trial court of its jurisdiction. 109 For this and other reasons, the Supreme Court
of Nebraska affirmed the district court’s holdings.

108

Gonzalez v. Gage, 290 Neb. 671, 672 (2015).

109

Id. at *681.
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NEVADA
CIVIL

DAVIS V. EWALEFO
352 P.3d 1139 (Nev. 2015)

FACTUAL SUMMARY:
The district court denied the father’s request for visitation in Africa, where he resides,
noting that the world is a dangerous place and that the proposed countries of visitation,
Rwanda and Uganda, had not signed the Hague Convention. 110 The father appealed,
arguing that the district court abused its discretion in denying his visitation request. 111 A
panel of the Supreme Court of Nevada affirmed, noting that in evaluating the father’s
request for visitation in Africa, the district court had considered “many factors regarding
the child's best interest.”112

CASE SUMMARY:
The Supreme Court granted a petition for en banc rehearing of the panel’s order. 113 The
court noted, “none of the district court's oral or written observations explain why the
district court ruled as it did,” and that there needs to be evidence of a credible threat that
the parent would abduct the child.114 The court reversed the district court’s decision and
remanded it for additional factual findings.

110

Davis v. Ewalefo, No. 63731, 2014 Nev. Unpub., LEXIS 1263, at *7 (July 31, 2014).

111

Id. at *1–2.

112

Id. at *2.

113

Davis v. Ewalefo, 352 P.3d 1139 (Nev. 2015).

114

Id. at 1145.
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NEW MEXICO
CIVIL

RAYELLEN RES., INC. V. N.M. CULTURAL PROPS
319 P.3d 639 (N.M. 2014)

FACTUAL SUMMARY:
After the New Mexico Cultural Properties Review Committee designated approximately
400,000 acres of land on Mount Taylor as “registered cultural property,” the owners of
the Cebolleta Land Grant objected. They argued that the common lands within the
Cebolleta Land Grant, which were included in the 400,000 acres, were not “state lands”
and so could not be taken by the state and registered as “cultural property.” 115

CASE SUMMARY:
The Supreme Court of New Mexico agreed, noting that its interpretation of state statutes
on the meaning of “state land” must be consistent with New Mexican obligations under
the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, which recognizes the private property rights of New
Mexico landowners from Mexico. 116

115

Rayellen Res., Inc. v. N.M. Cultural Props. Review Comm., 319 P.3d 639 (N.M. 2014).

116

Id.
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NEW YORK
CIVIL

R.B. V. K.G.
993 N.Y.S.2d 869 (Fam. Ct. 2014)

FACTUAL SUMMARY:
A father alleged that the mother of his children had wrongfully retained his children in
the United States. He petitioned for the return of the children to Israel under the Hague
Convention.117

CASE SUMMARY:
The New York County Family Court ordered the return of the children to Israel. After a
lengthy discussion of the Hague Convention, the court held that the mother had
wrongfully retained the children in the United States, and that her affirmative defense
that the children were well-settled in the United States and preferred to remain here was
unsuccessful.118 The court noted that it would “effectively eviscerate the purposes of the
Hague Convention” to allow a “custodial parent [to] wrongfully remove or retain children
in a new environment and allow that to continue indefinitely, seriously impairing the
noncustodial parent’s custody rights, because the children like living in an exciting new
environment.”119

117

R.B. v. K.G., 993 N.Y.S.2d 869, 872 (Fam. Ct.).

118

Id. at 886.

119

Id. at 886.
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CRIMINAL

PEOPLE V. JEMMOTT
125 A.D.3d 1005 (NY. App. Div. 2015)

FACTUAL SUMMARY:
The defendant was convicted of murder in the second degree and of tampering with
physical evidence.120

CASE SUMMARY:
On appeal, the defendant claimed that his post-arrest statements should have been
suppressed due to the failure of police to inform him of his right to consular notification
under the VCCR. The appellate court rejected this claim, holding that “[t]o the extent
that the treaty does confer any individually enforceable rights, it is unquestionable that
no remedy is required in the absence of a showing of prejudice” and that no prejudice
had been shown in this case.121

120

People v. Jemmott, 125 A.D.3d 1005, 1005 (NY. App. Div. 2015).

121

Id. at 1006.
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OHIO
CRIMINAL

STATE V. KIRKLAND
140 Ohio St. 3d 73 (2014)

FACTUAL SUMMARY:
The defendant was sentenced to death after having been found guilty of murdering four
women.122

CASE SUMMARY:
On appeal, the defendant argued that under international law, prohibiting the death
penalty is a peremptory norm, and that his execution by lethal injection would violate
several international treaties: the American Declaration, ICCPR, CERD, and CAT. The
court focused on the international treaties that it had not previously addressed in death
penalty cases, the CERD and the CAT, and held that because Ohio’s death penalty
procedures were not unconstitutional or racially discriminatory, they were consistent
with international law.123

122

State v. Kirkland, 140 Ohio St. 3d 73, 73-79 (2014).

123

Id. at 90-91. The court suggested that a defendant would have to advance “[an] argument that these issues, as defined under
international law, differ in any significant way from the constitutional arguments already addressed, e.g., that equal protection
and arbitrariness would be evaluated differently under international law than they are under the United States or Ohio
Constitutions,” for them to be considered separately. Id.
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OREGON
CIVIL

ESPINOZA V. EVERGREEN HELICOPTERS, INC.
359 Or. 63 (2016)

FACTUAL SUMMARY:
A helicopter crashed in a remote part of Peru, which resulted in the deaths of all the
passengers.124 Plaintiffs brought wrongful death actions in Oregon against Evergreen
Helicopters, Inc., an Oregon corporation that provided the helicopter and the pilot.
Evergreen moved to dismiss, arguing that under the doctrine of forum non conveniens,
Peru was the proper forum for the plaintiff’s wrongful death lawsuits. 125 The lower court
granted Evergreen’s motion to dismiss.
CASE SUMMARY:
The Supreme Court of Oregon held that the trial court erred in accepting the
defendant’s claim that Oregon was an inconvenient forum, noting that the American
Letters Protocol provides mechanisms for the sometimes-challenging task of
international evidence gathering.126

124

Espinoza v. Evergreen Helicopters, Inc., 359 Or. 63, 63-64 (2016).

125

Id.

126

Id. at 108, 108 n.25.
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TEXAS
CRIMINAL

EX PARTE OWENGA
2014 Tex. App. LEXIS 7265 (Ct. App. 2014)

FACTUAL SUMMARY:
The defendant pleaded guilty to evading arrest in exchange for four years’ deferred
adjudication community supervision—and then filed a verified application for writ of
habeas corpus, which was denied.127

CASE SUMMARY:
On appeal, the defendant argued pro se that his writ of habeas corpus was wrongfully
denied because he had been prejudiced by the trial counsel’s failure to inform him of his
VCCR rights.128 The defendant had filed the writ because, under counsel’s advice, he
had accepted a guilty plea without understanding the immigration consequences of
doing so.129 The Texas Second Court of Appeals rejected the claim, finding that the
defendant had failed to provide any evidence suggesting that consular notification would
have affected his decision to accept the plea bargain. 130 Citing a Texas case from 2005,
the court indicated that Texas courts had previously rejected claims of prejudice under
the VCCR when “there was no evidence in the record that [a] consulate … regularly
provided any assistance at all to its detained foreign nationals” or when “assertions of
prejudice are entirely speculative.”131

127

Ex parte Owenga, No. 02-13-00038-CR, 2014 Tex. App. LEXIS 7265, at *1 (App. Ct. July 3, 2014).

128

Id. at *18.

129

Id. at *5–7.

130

Id. at *18.

131

Id. at *19.
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MARTINEZ V. STATE
449 S.W.3d 193 (Tex. App. 2014)

FACTUAL SUMMARY:
The trial court convicted the defendant of aggravated sexual assault of his common law
wife, sentenced him to seventeen years and 200 days of imprisonment, and ordered
him to pay a $2,000 fine.132

CASE SUMMARY:
The defendant appealed his conviction on the grounds that his right to consular
notification under the VCCR had been violated. 133 The appellate court dismissed the
defendant’s VCCR claim, noting that the treaty provides for a right to consular
notification, not consular assistance,134 and that because the trial court recessed to
allow the defendant to speak with consular authorities, the defendant’s VCCR rights
were not violated.135

132

Martinez v. State, 449 S.W.3d 193, 196 (Tex. App. 2014).

133

Id. at 201, 203.

134

Id. at 202.

135

Id.
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UTAH
CRIMINAL

STATE V. HOUSTON
353 P.3d 55 (Utah 2015)

FACTUAL SUMMARY:
After a seventeen-year-old defendant pleaded guilty to aggravated murder, a jury
sentenced him to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole (LWOP). The
defendant appealed, arguing that his sentence was unconstitutional and that his
counsel had been ineffective.136

CASE SUMMARY:
The Utah Supreme Court affirmed, noting that the LWOP sentence was neither cruel
nor unusual.137 The lone dissenting judge disagreed on this point, noting that the CRC
condemns sentencing juveniles to LWOP.138

136

State v. Houston, 353 P.3d 55, ¶ 1 (Utah 2015).

137

Id. ¶¶ 60–63.

138

Id. ¶¶ 276, 274. The dissenting judge noted that only Somalia and the United States have failed to sign the CRC.
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WEST VIRGINIA
CRIMINAL

BRAYNEN V. PLUMLEY
2016 W. Va. LEXIS 222

FACTUAL SUMMARY:
After his conviction of sexual assault in the second degree, the defendant filed a petition
for a writ of habeas corpus, which the Ohio County Circuit Court denied.

CASE SUMMARY:
The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia affirmed the denial based on the court’s
rejection of the defendant’s claim that DNA evidence should have been suppressed
because the police violated his consular notification rights under the VCCR. 139 The court
noted that the VCCR provides a right to consular notification, not consular intervention,
and that suppression would be a “vastly disproportionate remedy” for a violation of
consular notification rights.140

139

Braynen v. Plumley, No. 15-0334, 2016 W. Va. LEXIS 222 (Apr. 8, 2016).

140

Id. (citing Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 548 U.S. 331, 343–350, 126 S. Ct. 2669, 165 L. Ed. 2D 557 (2006)).
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WISCONSIN
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE
STATE OF WISCONSIN
2014 Wisc. AG LEXIS 11

FACTUAL SUMMARY:
The Chairman of the Assembly Committee on Organization asked the Wisconsin
Attorney General whether a state statute that limits the amount of Wisconsin land that
may be acquired by non-nationals,141 applies to nations bound by the General
Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS), an international trade agreement that
promotes “international trade in services.” 142 As a GATS Member, the United States is
bound to treat non-resident service suppliers in the same way it would treat national
service providers in a number of specific service areas. 143

CASE SUMMARY:
The Attorney General concluded that that the Wisconsin statute is generally inapplicable
to GATS Members and their service suppliers because (1) the Wisconsin statute does
not limit land acquisition by non-nationals for most of the specific service areas in which
the United States, as a GATS member, must provide national treatment for nonresident
aliens and foreign corporations,144 and (2) the Wisconsin statute includes a “treaty
exception” under which the statute’s acreage limitations are suspended when an
international treaty recognizes the rights of non-nationals to hold larger quantities of
land.145

141

Wis. Stat. § 710.02(1).

142

2014 Wis. AG LEXIS 11.

143

Id. ¶ 11.

144

Id. ¶ 11.

145

Id. ¶ 17.
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Conclusion
State courts and attorneys general have continued to look to human rights principles to
help define state constitutional and statutory guarantees and this provides an opening to
further develop the law. State court litigants should consider incorporating international
human rights standards as interpretive guides for state constitutional and statutory
guides whenever strategically possible. This approach has several advantages. It
insulates decisions from review by the U.S. Supreme Court and protects them from
removal to federal court.146 Thus, state courts can safely develop their own international
human rights jurisprudence without the possibility of intervention and frustration by
federal courts. This “indirect incorporation” approach also allows state courts to
circumnavigate the self-execution doctrine and reservations to treaties that otherwise
may limit treaties’ impact. These limitations are less relevant when state courts are not
asked to apply treaties as governing law.
And over time, as international human rights principles become more integrated into
state law, courts will define rights more broadly and will hold governments accountable
for enforcing those rights, expanding opportunity for all Americans.

146

See, e.g., Paul Hoffman, The Application of International Human Rights Law in State Courts: A View from California , 18 INT’L
LAWYER 61 (1984) (“Another advantage of using human rights law as an interpretive device rather than arguing that it is binding on
the state court as treaty or customary law is that a California decision which adopts a human rights norm to interpret California
law cannot be reviewed by the U.S. Supreme Court; it is insulated from Supreme Court review because there is an ‘independent
state ground’ for the decision.”).
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Appendix A
The following terms and combination of terms were used to search, within each state,
case law and Attorney General Opinions that indicate the consideration of international
human rights law:
I.
II.
III.
IV.
V.
VI.

“Treat!” within the same paragraph as “international”
“International” within the same paragraph as “covenant”
“Convention” within the same paragraph as “right!”
“Inter-American”
“Univers! Decl!”
“Vienna Convention”

The use of an “!” behind a word indicates a search for all variations of the word that we
were searching for. For example, when “treat!” is used in our search terms, we were
searching for the words “treaty” and “treatise
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